Cloud computing allows customers to utilise IT services in a pay-asyou-go fashion to save huge cost on IT infrastructure. In open cloud, 'malicious' service providers could record service data from a cloud customer and collectively deduce the customer's privacy without the customer's permission. Accordingly, customers need to take certain actions to protect their privacy automatically at client sides, such as noise obfuscation. For instance, it can generate and inject noise service requests into real ones so that service providers are hard to distinguish which ones are real. Existing noise obfuscations focus on concealing occurrence probabilities of service requests. But in reality, association probabilities of service requests can also reveal customer privacy. So, we present a novel association probability based noise generation strategy by concealing these association probabilities. The simulation comparison demonstrates that this strategy can improve the effectiveness of privacy protection significantly from the perspective of association probability.
Introduction
Cloud computing is positioning itself as a promising and market-oriented service platform for delivering information infrastructures and resources [1] . Customers can use these services in a pay-as-you-go fashion while saving huge capital investments on their own IT infrastructures. However, cloud customers may concern about their privacy since they do not have much direct control inside the cloud [2] . So, privacy protection about service is critical as one of the most important research issues in cloud computing.
In cloud environments, there are many organisations which operate under various regulations to protect their customers' privacy. Meanwhile, many 'malicious' and unknown service providers could exist in these open and virtualised environments. Such service providers may collect service data from customers, and then deduce
Novel Association Probability based Noise Generation Strategy
Concealing association probabilities is the goal of privacy protection in this paper, and APNGS focuses on how to model, analyse and conceal these association probabilities. In this section, we firstly discuss association probability based noise injection model to support APNGS. Then, we present association probability model for noise generation. After that, we discuss two key issues of noise generation-noise generation probabilities and noise injection intensity. Lastly, we propose APNGS.
Association Probability based Noise Injection Model
The noise injection model is based on other existing representative noise injection models [6] [7] [8] with some modifications to support APNGS as depicted in 4 7 H Fig. 1 .
Q R : queue of customer's real service requests to be protected. Q N : queue of 'noise' service requests to be injected in Q R . Q S : queue of final service requests composing of Q R and Q N . Q : a common set of Q R , Q S and Q N . And Q={q 1 ,q 2 ,…,q i ,…,q n }. ε: probability for injecting
. It is the noise injection intensity. 'Association probabilities': they are the basis of this strategy and guide noise generations. 'Noise generation': its function is to generate Q N . We use 'Association probabilities' and 'Counter' to get noise generation probabilities in APNGS.
The overall working process of the model is to inject Q N into Q R based on ε , and Q S is the result. The model can be described as follows: the customer generates a real service request queue Q R to be sent. The noise service request queue Q N is generated by APNGS. To obtain Q S , a switch function is: the next service request in Q S comes from Q N on the probability of ε, and from Q R on the probability of 1-ε. Suppose q i is an item of Q and P(Q R =q i )(t), P(Q N =q i )(t) and P(Q S =q i )(t) are occurrence probabilities of q i in Q R , Q N and Q S at time t, respectively.
Association Probability Model for Noise Generation
In this part, we investigate how to obtain association probabilities from service request queues in this association probability model for noise generation.
To define these association probabilities, we have:
In equation (1), AP denotes association probabilities, and it is an n×n matrix. Each item in this matrix AP[i,j] is association probability between q i and q j .
Sliding window is the key and widely used approach to analyse information in a data stream or queue [9] . In this paper, we use a minimised and fixed sliding window to generate association probabilities. As a basic form of sliding windows, a minimised and fixed sliding window can aid to analyse data streams in terms of basic features. So, we obtain the association probability model for noise generation:
In equation (2), Con i,j (Q R ) is the number of events that q i and q j are sent together in Q R . Under minimised and fixed sliding windows, this event is that q j is immediately next to q i as a consequential relation in Q R . And we use time length t-1 as the denominator to normalise the equation. In some specific privacy protection situations, sliding window can be dynamic to withstand some specific privacy risks, such as side channel knowledge on it, or particular timestamps in request queues. In other words, sliding window is the changing key in noise obfuscation to protect privacy in cloud environments. And as a basic form, minimised and fixed sliding windows adopted in this paper can be easily modified to match specific noise obfuscations.
Association Probability based Noise Generation
In this part, we discuss two key issues in noise generation-noise generation probabilities and noise injection intensity. Suppose noise generation probabilities are ] ,
respectively. Noise injection intensity is ε which is introduced earlier.
1) Noise generation probabilities
In HPNGS [6] , noise generation probabilities are:
, which is historical and accumulative data from past Q R in practice as depicted in Fig.  1 , just like P(Q R =q i ). And n is the number of q i .
Besides, from Section 1 and [6] , existing strategies have the same noise generation goal:
. So, on the basis of equation (2), we get the noise generation goal in APNGS:
In equation (4), the noise generation goal is a family of conditional probabilities to express the probability of Q S being q i at time t+1, on the precondition of Q S being q j at previous time t. Besides, we have ] ,
, and T is the time length of the overall process.
To realise equation (4), we can utilise new noise generation probabilities in equation (5) on the basis of equation (3):
In equation (5), we have two components: equation (6) and equation (7):
In equation (6), P(Q R ,t+1,i,j) is a family of conditional probabilities to express the probability of Q R being q i at time t+1, on the precondition of Q S being q j at time t.
In equation (7), M(t+1,j) is the highest value, for every i, in a family of conditional probabilities to express the probability of Q R being q i at time t+1, on the precondition of Q S being q j at previous time t.
It is clear that equation (6) is the basis of equation (7). So, we only need to focus on equation (6) for association probabilities among service requests introduced before.
To obtain equation (6), we design a process on the basis of equation (2): this is an accumulative process. 3-dimension matrix Matrix(i,j,t) has three parameters: t is time parameter, i is from (Q R =q i )(t+1) which means an event that the ith request in the set Q will appear in Q R at time t+1, j is from (Q S =q j )(t) which means an event that the jth request in Q appears in Q S at time t. So, Matrix(i,j,t) means all past association relations among service requests q i and q j at time t. At a specific time, 2-dimension array C[i][j] can replace Matrix(i,j,t). We should collect all requests from time 1 to time t, and get accumulative C[i] [j] . So, P(Q R ,t,i,j)=Matrix(i,j,t)/SUM, Where SUM is the number of all association relations among past requests. This presents the implementation of association probability model.
2) Noise injection intensity
According to the association probability based noise injection model defined earlier, to operate noise injection processes, ε is a necessary parameter. From noise injection model and [6] , we can get the relation among Q S , Q N and Q R :
There are two components in equation (8): P(Q N ,t,i,j) and P(Q R ,t,i,j). So, we have equation (9) based on equations (6) and (4):
In equation (9), it is clear that the conditional probability of Q S being q i at time t+1 on the precondition of Q S being q j at previous time t is decided by the conditional probability of Q R being q i at time t+1 on the precondition of Q S being q j at previous time t , the conditional probability of Q N being q i at time t+1 on the precondition of Q S being q j at previous time t, and ε. So, we get ε by equations (8) and (4):
It is obvious that equation (5) and equation (10) can make the whole strategy to reach its goal-equation (4) . It can address the serious risk identified in Section 1.
Association Probability based Noise Generation Strategy
Title: Association probability based noise generation strategy Input: is the queue of real service requests Output:
is the queue of final service requests
Step 1: Collect data and compute association probabilities Initialise n*n+1 counters: C[1] [1] ,……,C [1] [n]…. ..C[n] [1] ,…...C[n][n], S to record numbers of associations among each service data item and the sum;
Receive service data from all past , update the correspondent C[i][j]++ and the sum S++; Compute previous association probabilities :
Step 2: Compute noise generation probabilities Generate noise generation probabilities by equation (5): by and ;
Step 3: Compute noise injection intensity Compute equation (10): to get the noise injection intensity; We have noise requests queue ;
Step 4: Noise injection process Generate a noise N by:
Inject N into on the probability of to get ; Update with counters.
Algorithm 1 APNGS: Association probability based noise generation strategy
In this part, we present APNGS. In Algorithm 1, we utilise n×n+1 counters to record the matrix and the sum of association relations among requests in Step 1. From equation (5), we can generate noise generation probabilities in Step 2. About noise injection intensity, equation (10) can obtain it in Step 3. At last, we can execute the noise injection processes in Step 4.
In summary, we can find out that the major improvement between APNGS's noise generation goal updating: replacing
. Hence, APNGS can perform better in privacy protection situations considering association probabilities than existing noise generation strategies.
Evaluation
In this section, we perform an experimental simulation in our cloud simulation system called SwinCloud [10] . The simulation process is primarily to compute and compare the effectiveness of privacy protection between APNGS and HPNGS directly, and we discuss comparisons about other existing strategies: TPNGS [7] and random generation [8] , too. Before the simulation, we generate a service queue as the real service queue from a set with a size of 10 randomly to operate two strategies.
We use a function: Var_Ass(Strategy, t) to express the main effectiveness of privacy protection on noise obfuscation to compare two strategies. And Var_Ass(Strategy, t) means that the variance of association probabilities in Q S under Strategy protected at time t. In other words, time t can express the size of Q R . Besides, we also use Var(Strategy, t) to denote the variance of occurrence probabilities in Q S with Strategy operating at time t. It denotes another aspect of the effectiveness of privacy protection. Fig. 2 , the horizontal coordinate is time t, and t has a range of [1, 6001] ; the vertical coordinate is Var_Ass. And if Var_Ass is lower, the effectiveness of privacy protection is better, so customer privacy is better kept. We can find out the overall trend being: with time passing, both of them keep on decreasing. Obviously, Var_Ass(APNGS,t)is about ¼ to ½ of Var_Ass(HPNGS,t). So, APNGS achieves a significant improvement on the effectiveness of privacy protection on noise obfuscation over HPNGS, in terms of association probability.
In Fig. 35 1 H , we find out that Var(APNGS,t) can keep within a low level of about 2.00e-05, and is lower than Var(HPNGS,t) which is about 3.00e-05. So, APNGS has better effectiveness of privacy protection on noise obfuscation in terms of occurrence probability than HPNGS. That is because association probabilities can consider more details of data queues than occurrence probabilities to keep service requests balance.
At last, the cost of noise obfuscation should also be considered by the noise injection intensity. In 5 2 H Fig. 4 , ε of APNGS is about 1.5 to 1 times more than ε of HPNGS with time passing. It means that APNGS costs more than HPNGS. So, to obtain better effectiveness of privacy protection, customers have to pay more. It is a trade-off depending on customers' demands.
About other typical noise generation strategies, such as random generation [8] and TPNGS [7] , APNGS also performs well: HPNGS has already improved efficiency of privacy protection from random generation with similar effectiveness. TPNGS still focuses on fluctuations of occurrence probabilities, and association probabilities are not incorporated.
In summary, APNGS can significantly improve the effectiveness of privacy protection on noise obfuscation in terms of association probability over existing representative strategies, with good effectiveness of privacy protection on noise obfuscation in terms of occurrence probability, at a reasonable extra cost.
Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we focused on privacy protection and noise obfuscation in cloud computing. To withstand some malicious service providers which are interested in association information among service requests, we analysed association probabilities in request queues and concealed them by noise obfuscation. Hence, we proposed a novel association probability based noise generation strategy (APNGS). The evaluation demonstrated that APNGS could significantly improve the effectiveness of privacy protection on noise obfuscation in terms of association probabilities, at a reasonable extra cost, in comparison to existing representative strategies.
Based on our current work, we plan to further investigate how to protect privacy in multiple malicious providers.
